

**Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 832.7,  
which was amended by Senate Bill (SB) 1421, effective  
January 1, 2019, and again by Senate Bill (SB) 16,  
effective January 1, 2022,  
a redacted version of this report is subject to disclosure  
under the California Public Records Act.**

## INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

November 1, 2023

3.2

**TO:** The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

**FROM:** Chief of Police

**SUBJECT:** OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING, FID NO. 003-23

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 003-23. On October 11, 2023, this case was presented to the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB). The recommended findings were not unanimous, with a minority opinion rendered regarding the tactics used by Officers C. Guerrero, Serial No. 41997, and D. Bracamontes, Serial No. 40514, Newton Patrol Division. I have carefully weighed each opinion and considered the case in its entirety. My recommended findings are outlined below and I hereby submit my findings per Police Commission policy.

### SUMMARY<sup>1</sup>

On Tuesday, January 3, 2023, at approximately 1640 hours, Witness [REDACTED] was on the east side of Central Avenue, north of 28<sup>th</sup> Street. [REDACTED] observed a male, later identified as O. Sanchez, removing wire from a light pole and wrapping it around a large kitchen knife. [REDACTED] called Communications Division (CD). While on hold, [REDACTED] observed Sanchez walking on Central Avenue, repeatedly throwing objects at passing vehicles. [REDACTED] reported Sanchez' actions, and CD broadcast a radio call of an "ADW (Assault with a Deadly Weapon) suspect there now" at 28<sup>th</sup> Street and Central Avenue.<sup>2</sup>

Officers Guerrero and Bracamontes, along with other Newton Patrol Division officers, responded to the call and located Sanchez as he was entering the rear yard of an [REDACTED] residence at [REDACTED]. The officers followed Sanchez and called out to him several times. Sanchez ignored the officers and ascended an external staircase on the north side of the residence to a [REDACTED] landing. Sanchez remained on the landing while Officer Bracamontes briefly spoke with Witness [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] told Officer Bracamontes that Sanchez' first name was Oscar and that he lived with [REDACTED] in the room upstairs. Shortly after, Sanchez entered the residence.

<sup>1</sup> The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

<sup>2</sup> Security footage from [REDACTED] shows Sanchez was carrying a metal pole in his left hand and a knife-type object in his right hand.

Officer Guerrero requested additional information from CD, who advised that the Person Reporting (PR) no longer observed the suspect and described him as last seen walking east on 28<sup>th</sup> Street, wearing a dark blue sweater with the words "Electric Crew."<sup>3</sup> Additionally, CD reported that the suspect had thrown a knife at a passing vehicle that was no longer in the area. Officer Guerrero broadcast a Code Four and that all parties appeared to be gone on arrival (GOA).<sup>4</sup>

Approximately 30 minutes later, Victim [REDACTED] was driving north on Central Avenue from 28<sup>th</sup> Street, when he observed Sanchez throw an unknown object at [REDACTED] vehicle. [REDACTED] stopped [REDACTED] vehicle and upon exiting, was approached by Sanchez who was communicating "What!" through body language. [REDACTED] observed Sanchez holding a 3-foot "metal tube" in his left hand and a knife with a 5-inch shiny blade in his right hand. After [REDACTED] told Sanchez he hit [REDACTED] car, Sanchez made slashing motions toward [REDACTED] with the knife from approximately six feet away. [REDACTED] backed away from Sanchez, who continued his advance, and [REDACTED] pulled out [REDACTED] cell phone to call CD. Sanchez then walked to the rear of [REDACTED] car and broke the left rear taillight with an unknown object. Sanchez then walked south on Central Avenue to east 28<sup>th</sup> Street. [REDACTED] observed him throw an object at another passing vehicle, which did not stop, and then made the call to CD to report the incident. [REDACTED] also observed Sanchez' actions and called CD again.

The following personnel responded to the radio call: Officers Bracamontes, Guerrero, C. Manzo, Serial No. 44890, O. Ortiz, Serial No. 40057, J. Stannard, Serial No. 38538, D. Moreno, Serial No. 45158, J. Solorzano, Serial No. 37982, D. Cisterna-Gallardo, Serial No. 44706, Newton Patrol Division, and Sergeant E. Asawesna, Serial No. 31152, Newton Patrol Division.

Officers Solorzano and Cisterna-Gallardo met with [REDACTED] verified a felony crime had occurred and obtained a signed crime report. The other officers responded to the front of the residence that Sanchez had entered previously and observed [REDACTED] walking in the rear yard. The officers requested [REDACTED] come to the sidewalk and speak with them. [REDACTED] told Officer Bracamontes in Spanish that Sanchez had walked up the rear stairs where he lives with [REDACTED] and another person, but that Sanchez and [REDACTED] were the only ones currently there. Officer Solorzano relayed [REDACTED] statements to Sergeant Asawesna and a plan was formulated to contact Sanchez.

The officers moved to the backyard via a walkway between [REDACTED] and observed Sanchez on the [REDACTED] landing, holding a chain and a metal pipe.<sup>5</sup> Officer Bracamontes told Sanchez in Spanish to drop the items and come down to the officers. Officer Bracamontes and Ortiz also identified themselves as police officers. During this time, Sergeant Asawesna directed Officer Solorzano to get a ballistic shield from his vehicle and Officer Guerrero requested a Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) Rescue Ambulance (RA) to standby. Several officers attempted to speak with Sanchez in both English and Spanish to have him put

<sup>3</sup> This clothing description matched the sweater Sanchez wore with the words "Electrical Crew" written on the back.

<sup>4</sup> The officers were not able to locate a victim or verify if a crime had occurred, so they did not attempt to detain Sanchez because his demeanor led them to believe they would have to possibly engage in a use of force with him.

<sup>5</sup> The landing was approximately 15 feet by approximately six feet, and a [REDACTED] obscured the officers' view of Sanchez when he was not directly in front of the stairs.

down the items and come down the stairs, but Sanchez refused to comply. Sanchez paced back and forth dragging the heavy metal chain and complained in Spanish about the lights being shined on him, yelling, "You're not going to rob me, idiot!"

Sergeant Asawesna told the officers that if Sanchez were to enter the residence, they would go in after him. After approximately four minutes of speaking to Sanchez, he entered the residence and closed the door. At the base of the stairs, Officer Guerrero equipped himself with the shield and requested an officer with less-lethal to join him and Officer Bracamontes.<sup>6</sup> Officer Manzo joined and assumed the role of less-lethal, equipped with the 40-millimeter less lethal launcher (40mm LLL). The three officers ascended the stairs while Sergeant Asawesna remained at ground level. Officer Guerrero reached the landing, approached the partially ajar front door and opened it. Officer Bracamontes assumed a position to Officer Guerrero's left and used his left hand to fully open the front door. Officer Manzo stopped behind and slightly to the right of Officer Guerrero.<sup>7</sup> Officers Moreno, Stannard and Ortiz were positioned single file on the stairs, with Sergeant Asawesna positioned at the base of the stairs.

Officer Bracamontes ordered Sanchez in Spanish to come out. Approximately six seconds after opening the front door, Sanchez forcefully opened the interior door armed with what was later determined to be a sharpened screwdriver mounted in a scooter fork. Officer Bracamontes ordered Sanchez in Spanish to get down as Officer Guerrero ordered Sanchez in English to put the weapon down. Simultaneously, Officer Manzo stepped forward to Officer Guerrero's right and Sanchez began advancing toward the officers, resulting in an OIS.<sup>8</sup>

Sanchez fell to the floor inside the bedroom and Officer Guerrero announced, "Shots fired, put it out," followed by, "Suspect down, no Code Four." Officer Solorzano notified CD that an OIS had occurred and moments later, Sergeant Asawesna broadcast a Code Four and requested two additional units. After CD broadcast the help call and the location, Sergeant Asawesna broadcast another Code Four, directing responding units not to overdrive. Officer Guerrero passed the shield to Officer Moreno and removed the plastic barrel from the bathroom with assistance from Officer Bracamontes.

Officer Guerrero ordered Sanchez not to move or touch anything as he and Officers Bracamontes, Manzo and Moreno approached Sanchez. Officer Guerrero grabbed Sanchez' left arm and rolled him onto his stomach and Officer Manzo slung the 40mm LLL and grabbed Sanchez' right arm. Officer Moreno replaced Officer Guerrero and grabbed Sanchez' left arm as Officer Manzo handcuffed Sanchez' wrists behind his back. Officers Manzo and Moreno rolled Sanchez onto his right side as they searched him, recovering a knife from the left front pocket of Sanchez' hooded sweatshirt.

---

<sup>6</sup> The external staircase was approximately [REDACTED] and was missing railings from the bottom to the midpoint with several steps being unstable.

<sup>7</sup> The front door opened into a bathroom with a blue plastic 55-gallon barrel located approximately five feet in front of the officers along the east wall. Opposite the officers, was the interior door on the south wall opened by Sanchez prior to the OIS.

<sup>8</sup> A Sound Graph Analysis determined a 40mm LLL round and six pistol rounds were fired simultaneously in approximately 1.2 seconds.



Officer Manzo ensured Sanchez remained in a recovery position on his right side, while Officer Guerrero used a towel found in the room to [REDACTED] on Sanchez' chest until he was relieved by Officer Moreno. The officers determined Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) was not necessary because Sanchez had a pulse and was breathing. After discussing the condition of the stairs, Officers Guerrero, Manzo and Moreno lifted Sanchez by his arms and legs and carried him down the stairs where they were met by arriving LAFD personnel. The officers then assisted LAFD with carrying Sanchez to a gurney at the front of the residence and RA 14 transported Sanchez to Los Angeles General Medical Center (LA General), where he was pronounced deceased at 1955 hours.<sup>9</sup>

## **FINDINGS**

**Tactics** – Administrative Disapproval, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero and Sergeant Asawesna. Tactical Debrief, Officer Manzo.

**Drawing/Exhibiting** – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero.

**Less-Lethal Use of Force**<sup>10</sup> – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Manzo.

**Lethal Use of Force** – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero.

## **ANALYSIS**<sup>11</sup>

### **Detention**

Officers received a radio call in which Sanchez was described as throwing objects at passing vehicles near Central Avenue and 28<sup>th</sup> Street. Officers were unable to verify if a crime occurred and disengaged from Sanchez, who fled into an [REDACTED] residence. Approximately 30 minutes later, a second radio call was generated for Sanchez throwing metal tools at passing vehicles and was armed with a knife. Officers met with [REDACTED] who advised Sanchez vandalized [REDACTED] car and threatened [REDACTED] with a knife. Sanchez fled to the same [REDACTED] residence from the first radio call and officers located him on the [REDACTED] landing. Officers made repeated attempts to have Sanchez comply, but he fled into the [REDACTED] residence. Based on the totality of the circumstances, officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Sanchez.

### **Tactics**<sup>12</sup>

*Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: "The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could be improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance*

<sup>9</sup> On May 3, 2023, University of Southern California Medical Center was renamed LA General.

<sup>10</sup> Pursuant to the Office of the Chief of Police Special Order No. 14, August 22, 2023, Less-Lethal Control devices have subsequently been renamed to Intermediate Force Options.

<sup>11</sup> The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the FID investigation.

<sup>12</sup> Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05.

*future performance by reviewing and analyzing Department-wide training, practices, policies and procedures. The Tactical Debrief analysis shall not focus on, or document findings, recommendations, or analysis of individual employees or the incident."*

*Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: "A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05)."*

*The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.*

### Tactical De-Escalation<sup>13</sup>

*Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.*

*Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.*

*Tactical De-Escalation Techniques: Planning; Assessment; Time; Redeployment and/or Containment; Other Resources; and, Lines of Communication.*

**Planning** – Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero worked together on numerous occasions since 2019 and discussed tactics throughout their time working together, including contact/cover roles, less-lethal options and theoretical scenarios. They discussed the comments of the call while enroute and, while in front of the residence, formed a team and plan with other officers to contact Sanchez. Sergeant Asawesna ensured all necessary roles were filled. After Sanchez entered the residence, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero formed a second team and plan to make entry into the residence. Again, Sergeant Asawesna ensured all necessary roles were filled. After the OIS, Officers Guerrero and Bracamontes formed a plan to approach Sanchez and handcuff him.

**Assessment** – During the first radio call, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero assessed Sanchez during their brief encounter with him. The officers assessed Sanchez' behavior and did not attempt to detain him before verifying a crime had occurred as they believed any attempt at a detention would lead to a use of force. While enroute to the second radio call, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero assessed the possibility of Sanchez being armed based on the comments of the call. The officers verified the crime of ADW with a knife had been committed

---

<sup>13</sup> Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force Tactics Directive No. 16, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques, October 2016.

by Sanchez. After contacting Sanchez, they observed him armed with a chain and pipe. Once Sanchez dropped the items and entered the residence, Officers Bracamontes and Manzo assessed he was no longer armed and believed he was not barricaded, while Officer Guerrero was unsure if he dropped them. Sergeant Asawesna did not observe any weapons at all but believed Sanchez was possibly armed with a knife and recalled that Sanchez' [REDACTED] was possibly in the residence with him based on [REDACTED] statements and assessed the need to make entry to protect him.

**Time and Redeployment/Containment** – Prior to officers contacting Sanchez in the backyard, Officers Solorzano and Cisterna-Gallardo remained at the front of the residence creating containment in the event Sanchez exited through the front door. The officers that entered the backyard and contacted Sanchez on the landing used distance to create time, affording them more opportunities to gain voluntary compliance. Once Sanchez entered the residence, Sergeant Asawesna directed officers to go in after him to protect possible occupants of the residence. This caused the officers to position themselves on the landing in front of the exterior door prior to entering the residence. This position left the officers with limited redeployment options, as the landing was narrow and the staircase was unstable with missing hand railings. After the exterior door was opened, Sanchez' actions left the officers with no time to use other force options.

**Other Resources and Lines of Communication** – After the officers contacted Sanchez, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero attempted to communicate with him in Spanish and English, respectively. During their communication attempts, Officer Guerrero requested an RA to standby and Sergeant Asawesna asked Officer Solorzano to retrieve a ballistic shield from his vehicle. When Sanchez opened the interior door dynamically, Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero gave Sanchez commands again in Spanish and English.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

#### **Debriefing Point No. 1 Barricaded Suspects**

*A barricaded suspect incident prompting a SWAT response may include, but is not limited to the following criteria:*

- 1. The suspect is probably armed; **and***
- 2. Probable cause exists to believe that the suspect has been involved in a criminal act or is a threat to the lives and safety of the community and/or police; **and***
- 3. Is in a position of advantage, affording cover and/or concealment; **or** is contained in an open area and the presence or approach of police officers could precipitate an adverse reaction by the suspect; **and***
- 4. The suspect refuses to submit to a lawful arrest.*

***Note:** Not all suspects who refuse to surrender are considered barricaded suspects necessitating a SWAT response (Los Angeles Police Department Training Bulletin, Volume XLVIII, Issue 9, December 2019).*

Approximately 15 seconds before Sanchez entered the residence, Sergeant Asawesna told Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero, "Okay, if he goes inside there, we're gonna go after him."

Approximately four minutes after the officers began communicating with Sanchez, Sanchez entered the residence and closed the door. Officers Bracamontes, Manzo and Ortiz believed that Sanchez dropped the pipe and chain prior to entering the residence, but Officer Guerrero was unsure if Sanchez did.

Officer Bracamontes stated, *"I was under the impression that he was unarmed and that he went inside."*<sup>14</sup> Officer Bracamontes further stated, *"I didn't see it was like a barricaded suspect, you know, because he was unarmed and he -- he just went inside an unlocked door."*<sup>15</sup> Officer Guerrero stated, *"I have no idea. He would walk to the other side of the landing and he was out of -- out of sight from me. I don't know if he dropped it there. I -- I have no idea."*<sup>16</sup> Officer Guerrero further stated, *"Um, like I said, the sergeant had given the okay but, yeah, it was my decision -- it was -- it ultimately falls on us, right, to make the decision."*<sup>17</sup>

Officer Manzo stated, *"We waited a couple more minutes. Got the okay from a supervisor prior to going up the stairs."*<sup>18</sup> Officer Manzo, when speaking about Sergeant Asawesna, stated, *"He stood by as the primary unit assigned roles and then he -- prior to going upstairs, he gave the final okay prior to going up."*<sup>19</sup> Force Investigation Division investigators asked Officer Manzo, *"When the suspect went back into his residence did you see any items in his hands at that time?"* Officer Manzo replied, *"No."*<sup>20</sup>

According to Sergeant Asawesna, he did not see weapons in Sanchez' hands and described him as being uncooperative and either under the influence or mentally ill. After Sanchez entered the residence, Sergeant Asawesna did not consider him to be a barricaded suspect because he did not believe Sanchez was refusing to submit to arrest. Also, he believed that there were other occupants in the residence because [REDACTED] had told them that Sanchez' [REDACTED] was inside the residence at the time. Sergeant Asawesna was *"thinking about the safety of the people inside the house. So we needed to go inside to arrest him and possibly rescue the occupants."*<sup>21</sup>

The UOFRB assessed the tactics used by Officers Bracamontes, Guerrero and Manzo and Sergeant Asawesna as it pertains to the topic of barricaded suspects. With regards to Officer Manzo, the Board noted he was a new police officer and that he was still in the learning phase of his career. Given his lack of experience, the Board opined it was reasonable for Officer Manzo to follow the lead and decisions of the supervisor and senior officers at scene. The Board opined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Manzo would have acted as he did in that situation. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the tactics employed by Officer Manzo were a substantial deviation, with justification, from Department-approved tactical training.

---

<sup>14</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 15, Lines 6-12.

<sup>15</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 16, Lines 7-9.

<sup>16</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Page 65, Lines 4-15.

<sup>17</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Page 72, Lines 20-23.

<sup>18</sup> Officer Manzo's transcript, Page 10, Lines 4-5.

<sup>19</sup> Officer Manzo's transcript, Page 18, Lines 18-24.

<sup>20</sup> Officer Manzo's transcript, Page 19, Lines 16-19.

<sup>21</sup> Sergeant Asawesna's transcript, Page 25, Lines 11-14.



With regards to Sergeant Asawesna, the Board noted he directed the officers to go into the residence after Sanchez. The Board opined that Sergeant Asawesna's own statements indicated he believed Sanchez to possibly be armed with a knife and that the comments of the radio calls, as well as the statements of [REDACTED] should have led him to believe Sanchez was probably armed with a knife. The Board also opined that Sanchez' position inside a residence, located on the [REDACTED] accessible only by a dilapidated staircase and landing leading to the door, was a significant position of advantage. Additionally, the Board opined that when Sanchez refused to comply with the commands made by identified police officers to come downstairs and instead walked away and entered the residence, he was refusing to submit to a lawful arrest. Given the set of circumstances, the Board opined that Sergeant Asawesna should have recognized Sanchez to be a barricaded suspect and slowed down the incident by maintaining containment of Sanchez and contacting the Department's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team along with its [REDACTED]. Additionally, the Board opined Sergeant Asawesna could have contacted the [REDACTED] for advice based upon his assessment that Sanchez was possibly suffering from mental illness.

The Board assessed Sergeant Asawesna's justification for directing officers to go into the residence after Sanchez. The Board opined that his justification was insufficient, as Sergeant Asawesna was not sure if there was anyone else in the residence with Sanchez, and there was no specific indication from Sanchez that he was a danger to anyone possibly inside. The Board opined Sergeant Asawesna did not have sufficient evidence of an exigent circumstance necessitating the immediate entry of officers into the residence. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the tactics employed by Sergeant Asawesna were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department-approved tactical training.

With regards to Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero, the UOFRB Majority opined that despite Officer Bracamontes seeing Sanchez drop the chain and pipe, the comments of the radio calls and the statements of [REDACTED] should have led him to believe that Sanchez was probably armed with a knife. The UOFRB Majority noted that Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero had been directed to go after Sanchez into the residence by Sergeant Asawesna; however, the Majority opined that both officers were tenured and should have recognized the incident to be a barricaded suspect. As such, the Board opined the onus of the decision to go after Sanchez was not solely on Sergeant Asawesna, but also on Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero.

The UOFRB Minority disagreed with the Majority's assessment of Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero's tactics. The Minority opined officers respond to numerous radio calls with comments giving inaccurate information, which are often caused by victims and/or witnesses calling the police while in fear and reporting with vague, exaggerated or baseless statements. The Minority opined that although officers meet with PRs and victims of radio calls, they are still required to investigate further, adding that officers will rely more on their observations or the observations of other officers at scene. The Minority noted Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero did not observe Sanchez armed with a knife or any other edged weapon at any point during the incident and only observed him holding a chain and pipe, which they believed he dropped prior to entering the residence.

The UOFRB Minority noted that Sergeant Asawesna specifically gave Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero the command to go into the residence after Sanchez. The Minority opined that officers are expected to follow the directions and orders given by an Incident Commander (IC), especially from a tenured supervisor, unless ordered to do something illegal, unethical or immoral. Furthermore, the Minority opined that failing to obey an order could expose the officers to consequences for insubordination. The Minority noted that the Training Bulletin for Barricaded Suspects/Subjects states, *“Once the IC believes the incident meets the criteria for a barricaded suspect, the IC shall immediately contact Metropolitan Division’s Watch Commander (WC) to request SWAT.”*<sup>22</sup> In this incident, the Minority opined Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero were following the lawful order of their supervisor, who was the IC and who did not believe the incident met the criteria for a barricaded suspect.

The Minority opined the onus was on Sergeant Asawesna as the IC to determine whether Sanchez was a barricaded suspect and added the officers should not be penalized for following the reasonable and lawful order given by Sergeant Asawesna. Therefore, the UOFRB Minority opined that Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero substantially deviated from Department-approved tactical training with justification.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB Majority determined, and I concur, that the tactics employed by Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department-approved tactical training. To enhance future performance, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the tactical debrief.

### **Additional Tactical Debrief Topics**

**Ballistic Shield Manipulations** – After Officer Guerrero reached the landing, he saw the front door was partially ajar and advised the other officers he was going to open it. While holding the ballistic shield with his left arm and his service pistol with his right hand, he opened the door with his right index finger.

Although Officer Guerrero was able to open the door without violating any of the Basic Firearms Safety Rules, he could have had Officer Bracamontes, who was standing to his left, open the door for him. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Simultaneous, Nonconflicting Commands** – When Sanchez opened the interior door armed with a sharpened screwdriver mounted in a scooter fork, Officer Bracamontes ordered Sanchez in Spanish, to get down as Officer Guerrero ordered Sanchez in English to drop the object. Alternatively, Officers Guerrero and Bracamontes could have stuck to their assigned roles of contact and cover when confronting Sanchez to ensure that only one officer was giving commands. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

---

<sup>22</sup> Training Bulletin, Volume XLVIII, Issue 9, December 2019.



**Incident Commander Declaration** – Sergeant Asawesna arrived at scene as the first supervisor and did not declare himself as the IC. While Sergeant Asawesna engaged in duties indicative of an IC, he should have declared himself as the IC immediately upon arrival. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Code Four** – After Officer Solorzano notified CD of the OIS, Sergeant Asawesna broadcast a Code Four and requested two additional units. After CD broadcast the help call and the location, Sergeant Asawesna broadcast another Code Four and told responding units to “not overdrive.” The investigation determined that Sergeant Asawesna broadcast the second Code Four while the officers were in the process of handcuffing Sanchez. When asked if he knew Sanchez was in custody when he made the broadcast, Sergeant Asawesna stated that he did not. Although Sergeant Asawesna was trying to prevent officer-involved traffic collisions, he could have directed responding officers to drive more cautiously without broadcasting a Code Four prior to Sanchez being handcuffed. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Bloodborne Pathogens** – After the OIS, Sanchez was clearly bleeding from his wounds. As Officers Guerrero, Manzo and Moreno were taking Sanchez into custody, they did not wear protective gloves. After Sanchez was handcuffed, Officer Guerrero located a towel and [REDACTED] to Sanchez’ wound while Officers Manzo and Moreno put on gloves. Officer Bracamontes assisted Officer Guerrero in removing Sanchez’ makeshift plastic body armor without wearing gloves. Alternatively, Officers Guerrero, Manzo, Moreno and Bracamontes could have donned latex gloves before rendering aid to Sanchez. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

**Preservation of Evidence** – Officer Solorzano entered the room after Sanchez was handcuffed, donned gloves and moved the makeshift stabbing weapon from the front edge of the brown chair to the rear portion of the seat. He then picked up the metal pipe and utility knife from the floor and placed them on the brown chair. According to Officer Solorzano, he moved them because he was concerned the items could be lost, damaged or destroyed due to the tight confines of the room, resulting in the evidence not being properly documented. Given the circumstances in this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the movement of the evidence was reasonable; however, the preservation of evidence and the decision to move evidence is a worthy topic. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Officer Manzo unloaded the 40mm LLL at 1754:22 hours after firing one round during the OIS. Officer Manzo should have left the 40mm LLL round in the chamber until it was given to FID personnel or a supervisor. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

## **Command and Control**

*Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives, and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.*

*Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct officers, and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness, shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).*

*Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).*

*Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources, and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, Los Angeles Police Department Emergency Operations Guide).*

While forming a plan to contact Sanchez, Sergeant Asawesna ensured the roles of contact, designated cover officer (DCO), less-lethal and arrest team were filled. Once they contacted Sanchez, Sergeant Asawesna directed Officer Solorzano to get a ballistic shield from his vehicle and told Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero to follow Sanchez into the residence if he were to go inside. Sanchez entered the residence and the officers assembled at the base of the stairs, forming another plan to follow Sanchez. Sergeant Asawesna directed additional officers to join the team as arresting officers, ensuring again that all needed roles were filled. He also ensured officers were positioned in front of the residence for containment. As the officers ascended the stairs, Sergeant Asawesna remained at ground level near the stairs because he believed it provided him the best position for oversight of the team given the narrow and unstable staircase.

Moments after the OIS occurred and after CD was notified, Sergeant Asawesna walked away from the base of the staircase toward the front of the residence. Without direct awareness of what was happening on the [REDACTED] and without knowing if the suspect was in custody,

Sergeant Asawesna broadcast a Code Four and requested two additional units to respond. Shortly after, Sergeant Asawesna broadcast a second Code Four and directed responding officers to not overdrive. The officers formed a plan to carry Sanchez downstairs to get him to LAFD more quickly and briefed Sergeant Asawesna of the plan, who agreed to it. As the officers carried Sanchez to the front of the residence, Sergeant Asawesna directed Officer L. Anchondo, Serial No. 40664, Newton Patrol Division, to gather some officers to clear the rest of the residence to ensure that no one was injured due to the OIS. Sergeant Asawesna remained at ground level and directed the officers in the room where the OIS occurred to vacate the location so they would not be in the line of fire of the searching officers.

Once the RA left the scene with Sanchez, Sergeant Asawesna gathered all involved personnel and directed them to shut off their body worn video (BWV) cameras. While monitoring the officers, Sergeant Asawesna admonished them not to speak about the incident. Shortly after, Sergeant F. Rocha, Serial No. 39617, Newton Area Gang Enforcement Detail (GED), arrived at scene, and Sergeant Asawesna directed him to oversee the tactical portion of the incident. Sergeant Asawesna took the involved officers' BWV cameras and continued to monitor them until additional supervisors arrived to assist him. At no point during this incident did Sergeant Asawesna go upstairs to the [REDACTED]

Detective J. Azizi, Serial No. 40465, Newton Area Detectives, gathered a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Officer Guerrero and transported Officers Guerrero, Stannard, Moreno, Solorzano, Cisterna-Gallardo and Ortiz to Newton Station at various times. Sergeant J. Guerra, Serial No. 30949, Newton Area Community Relations Office (CRO), monitored Officer Guerrero. Sergeant S. Lopez, Serial No. 38697, Newton Area GED, monitored Officer Bracamontes and gathered a PSS from him before monitoring Sergeant Asawesna. Sergeant Lopez was relieved of monitoring Sergeant Asawesna by Sergeant R. Saeli, Serial No. 39067, Central Patrol Division. Detective G. Beshai, Serial No. 36300, Newton Area Narcotics Enforcement Detail (NED), monitored Officer Bracamontes. Sergeant R. Kingi, Serial No. 31427, Community Safety Partnership Bureau (CSPB), monitored Officer Manzo and gathered a PSS from him. Detective J. Hershey, Serial No. 39146, Newton Area Detectives, monitored Officers Stannard and Moreno and later monitored Officers Ortiz, Solorzano and Cisterna-Gallardo.

The UOFRB was critical of Sergeant Asawesna's command and control immediately following the OIS. Sergeant Asawesna did not go to the [REDACTED] following the OIS and did not provide any command and control to the arrest team as they took the suspect into custody. The Board opined that because Sergeant Asawesna walked toward the front of the residence following the OIS, he was not in a position to gain adequate situational awareness or to give appropriate commands to the arrest team, which should have been his primary focus at the time.

The UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the overall actions of Sergeant Asawesna were not consistent with Department training and my expectations of supervisors during a critical incident. To enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

The Board also determined, and I concur, that the overall actions of Sergeants Rocha, Guerra, Lopez, Saeli and Kingi, and Detectives Azizi, Beshai and Hershey were consistent with Department training and my expectations of supervisors during a critical incident.

### **Tactical Debrief**

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the actions of Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero and Sergeant Asawesna were a substantial deviation, without justification from Department-approved tactical training. The Board also determined, and I concur, that Officer Manzo's actions were a substantial deviation with justification from Department-approved tactical training.

Each tactical incident merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved officers to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct Officers Bracamontes, Guerrero, Manzo, Moreno and Solorzano, and Sergeant Asawesna, to attend a Tactical Debrief and that the identified topics are discussed.

### **General Training Update (GTU)**

On January 11, 2023, Officers Bracamontes, Guerrero and Manzo and Sergeant Asawesna attended a GTU; all mandatory topics were covered.

### **Drawing/Exhibiting**

*Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: "Unnecessarily or prematurely drawing or exhibiting a firearm limits an officer's alternatives in controlling a situation, creates unnecessary anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm. Officers shall not draw or exhibit a firearm unless the circumstances surrounding the incident create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary to use the firearm in conformance with this policy on the use of firearms."*

*During a special meeting on September 29, 1977, the Board of Police Commissioners adopted the following as a valid interpretation of this Section: "Unnecessarily or prematurely drawing or exhibiting a firearm limits an officer's alternatives in controlling a situation, creates unnecessary anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm. An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80)."*



### **Officer Bracamontes**

After the officers assembled on the sidewalk in front of the [REDACTED] residence and formulated a plan to contact Sanchez in the backyard, the officers moved to the rear of the property. As they entered the property, Officer Bracamontes unholstered his service pistol because Sanchez was reportedly an armed ADW suspect who posed a threat to others, and Sanchez' exact location was unknown. This could be observed on Officer Moreno's BWV footage at 1744:06 hours.

Officer Bracamontes recalled,

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. So -- and so is that walkway -- then you're walking north. When you guys enter onto the property, once you start walking on -- at any point do you -- do you draw out your duty handgun?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Yes, sir. My -- I remember -- I remember, yes, I -- I drew out.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. When -- like when, specifically, did you do that?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Once we were in the walkway, and then we didn't -- the un -- uninvolved person said that he's in the back. We didn't -- we didn't -- we couldn't see the back. So I didn't know if -- if we'd hit the corn -- by, well, the time we hit the corner, he would jump out at us. So -- you know, so I -- I pulled out my pistol just in case if he were to jump out at us and try to attack us with -- with the -- with the weapon, what have you.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay.*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Because it was -- it was dark and we couldn't really see much.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: And is there any other specific reason, like, for this type of call, or -- or any knowledge you had why you would unholster your -- your pistol at this time?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Yeah. It was a ADW suspect. You know, every -- on both occasions, people said he was armed with weapons. And he posed a threat to people an hour ago. And now he's posing a threat to people right now, an hour later. And it was kind of confined -- the back. It wasn't -- you couldn't -- we couldn't really see if he was hiding in the back under the stairs or, like, around the corner. So I -- you know, I had my handgun just in case if I had to use lethal force.<sup>23</sup>*

### **Officer Guerrero (1<sup>st</sup> Occurrence)**

After the officers assembled on the sidewalk in front of the [REDACTED] residence and formulated a plan to contact Sanchez in the backyard, the officers moved to the rear of the property. As they entered the property, Officer Guerrero unholstered his service pistol because Sanchez was reportedly armed with a knife and had assaulted someone with it. This could be observed on Officer Bracamontes' BWV footage at 1738:12 hours.

Officer Guerrero recalled,

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Yes. Yeah, unholster early on because we know this person has a knife now and if we're -- if it's the same person as last time, which seemed to be uncooperative, yelling, agitated and the second radio call it seemed he's becoming more*

---

<sup>23</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 49-50, Lines 4-10.

*violent, we have an ADW. He went after someone with a knife. So, yeah, that was my reasoning for unholstering.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. And where were you physically when you did this?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: I was standing right at the gate, the entrance of the gate onto the property facing northbound where he was last seen.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. So this is prior to you guys advancing onto the property and prior to you seeing him --*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Yes.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: -- at the location?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Yes.<sup>24</sup>*

### **Officer Guerrero (2<sup>nd</sup> Occurrence)**

Post OIS, after Officer Moreno relieved Officer Guerrero of the task of holding Sanchez' left arm, Officer Guerrero got up and unholstered his service pistol to assist Officer Bracamontes in clearing the residence.

The UOFRB assessed Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero's drawing and exhibiting of their service pistols and noted that they were both aware of Sanchez possibly being armed with a knife based on the comments of the radio calls. The Board also noted the officers verified Sanchez had committed an ADW with a knife. The UOFRB further noted that the officers did not know Sanchez' exact location but were advised by [REDACTED] that he was standing on the [REDACTED] landing in the backyard. With regards to Officer Guerrero's second instance of drawing and exhibiting his service pistol, the Board noted that the residence had not been cleared after taking Sanchez into custody and the officers did not know if anyone else was lying in wait. Based on the available evidence, the Board opined that each instance of Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero's drawing and exhibiting conformed to policy.

Based on the totality of the circumstances the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero would reasonably believe there was a substantial risk that the situation may have escalated to the point where deadly force may have been justified.

Therefore, I find Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero's Drawing/ Exhibiting to be In Policy, No Further Action.

---

<sup>24</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Pages 56-57, Lines 23-15.



## **Policy on the Use of Force<sup>25</sup>**

### **Use of De-Escalation Techniques**

*It is the policy of this Department that, whenever feasible, officers shall use techniques and tools consistent with department de-escalation training to reduce the intensity of any encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.*

### **Verbal Warnings**

*Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of any force, make reasonable efforts to identify themselves as a peace officer and to warn that force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the person is aware of those facts.*

### **Proportionality**

*Officers may only use a level of force that they reasonably believe is proportional to the seriousness of the suspected offense or the reasonably perceived level of actual or threatened resistance.*

### **Rendering Aid**

*After any use of force, officers shall immediately request a rescue ambulance for any person injured. In addition, officers shall promptly provide basic and emergency medical assistance to all members of the community, including victims, witnesses, subjects, suspects, persons in custody, subjects of a use of force and fellow officers: To the extent of the officer's training and experience in first aid/CPR/AED; and, To the level of equipment available to an officer at the time assistance is needed.*

### **Requirement to Intercede When Excessive Force is Observed**

*An officer shall intercede when present and observing another officer using force that is clearly beyond that which is necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances, taking into account the possibility that other officers may have additional information regarding the threat posed by a subject.*

### **Factors Used to Determine Objective Reasonableness**

*Pursuant to the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor*, the Department examines the reasonableness of any particular force used: a) from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience, in the same situation; and b) based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:*

---

<sup>25</sup> Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10.

- *The feasibility of using de-escalation tactics, crisis intervention or other alternatives to force;*
- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects;*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances; and,*
- *Whether a person is a member of a vulnerable population.*

### **Use of Force – Deadly**

*It is the policy of this Department that officers shall use deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary for either of the following reasons: To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person; or, To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended.*

*In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible. Before discharging a firearm, officers shall consider their surroundings and potential risks to bystanders to the extent reasonable under the circumstances.*

**Note:** *Because the application of deadly force is limited to the above scenarios, an officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.*

### **The Department's Evaluation of Deadly Force**

*The Department will analyze an officer's use of deadly force by evaluating the totality of the circumstances of each case consistent with the California Penal Code Section 835(a), as well as the factors articulated in Graham v. Connor.*

#### **Less-Lethal Use of Force**

**Officer Manzo** – 40mm LLL, 40mm eXact iMPact, one round from approximately ten feet, in a southerly direction.

##### **Round One**

According to Officer Manzo, Sanchez was armed with a “sharp spear object” in his right hand which was pointed toward the officers at a downward 45-degree angle. He could see the front of the weapon and described it as a seven to ten-inch silver spear with a pointy end capable of causing serious bodily injury (SBI) or death. Sanchez began to lunge forward starting with his right leg, while pointing the object toward the officers, indicating to Officer Manzo that Sanchez was an immediate threat and intended to cause harm to him and the other officers. In response, Officer Manzo targeted Sanchez’ navel area and discharged one 40mm LLL round from approximately ten feet away, which he believed struck Sanchez in the navel area. Officer Manzo then immediately reloaded.<sup>26</sup>

Officer Manzo recalled,

*In his right hand he had a sharp object silver in color. Part -- primary gave commands to drop it and at a certain point I see the suspect start to kind of lunge forward being that we were right there very close and in small confinement, I deployed my 40 striking the suspect. Suspect goes down.<sup>27</sup>*

*So as we made it up the stairs, we get to the front of the door and we immediately see the door quickly open, the secondary door that was closed. And as soon as we see it open, the suspect is appeared behind the door. I see a metal object in his hand, right hand. He kind of pauses. At that time the primary unit gives command to the suspect to drop it, and I see that he starts kind of lunging forward. Being that we were relatively close, I would say five to 10 feet from the suspect and being that we were in a narrow position, I made the decision to shoot the 40 because at the same time we were stuck in a balcony being that if he would have charged us, we would have been in a very tough position to retrieve any cover. And I felt that at the moment if he would have charged, it was an immediate threat to the safety of my partners and myself as well.<sup>28</sup>*

<sup>26</sup> A review of BWV could not determine if Sanchez was struck by the round., It was determined that approximately four seconds had elapsed between Sanchez forcing the door open and the OIS.

<sup>27</sup> Officer Manzo’s transcript, Page 10, Lines 12-17.

<sup>28</sup> Officer Manzo’s transcript, Pages 21-22, Lines 22-14.

The UOFRB assessed Officer Manzo's application of the 40mm LLL during the incident. The Board noted that Officer Manzo discharged his 40mm LLL after observing Sanchez take a step toward the officers with his weapons in hand, and the Board opined that Sanchez' actions met the threshold of an immediate threat against the officers. The UOFRB noted that neither Officer Manzo nor any of the other officers gave Sanchez a warning prior to discharging the 40mm LLL but opined that there was too little time between the officers opening the exterior door and Sanchez advancing toward them for a warning to have been feasible.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Manzo in the same situation, would reasonably believe that the use of less-lethal force was objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officer Manzo's Less-Lethal Use of Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

### **Lethal Use of Force**

**Officer Bracamontes** – Smith & Wesson Model 4563 TSW, .45 caliber, three rounds from approximately ten feet, in a southerly direction.

**Background** – Upon inspecting the scene and relevant video evidence, FID investigators determined that the background for all three rounds was the same, consisting of a bedroom measuring 12 feet by ten feet and the south interior wall. A dresser drawer on the floor of the room was the only item identified as being struck by the officers' rounds.

### **Round One**

According to Officer Bracamontes, Sanchez kicked the interior door open and was holding what appeared to be a "harpoon gun," or homemade spear with a sharp point, in his right hand and another sharp chrome object in his left hand. He described the weapon in Sanchez' right hand as a four-foot-long black solid metal pole with a chrome-colored spear or harpoon extending an additional foot from one end. Officer Bracamontes described the object in Sanchez' left hand as L-shaped with a six-inch blade.

Officer Bracamontes described Sanchez as taking a fighting stance while holding the weapon at mid-chest level. He described Sanchez' demeanor as very angry, tense and agitated and making rapid body movements. Sanchez moved forward with his lead foot approximately one foot, decreasing the distance between him and the officers. Officer Bracamontes believed Sanchez was five feet away and feared that it would take a "split-second" for Sanchez to either shoot the harpoon gun or charge and stab the officers with the spear. In response, Officer Bracamontes fired his first round from his service pistol, which he believed hit Sanchez but had no apparent effect. The investigation determined Officer Bracamontes fired from approximately ten feet away.

Officer Bracamontes recalled,

*And so I was about to give out commands. "All right. We got a closed door. Can I get another unit to come up here?" But at that time he -- he just kicked the door open and was*

very agitated, very angry, just came at us in a -- in a very threatening manner. He had a -- he was like -- his body was all tensed up like he wanted to kill us or -- or kill someone. And he had a -- like, a -- it appeared, like, to be a harpoon gun. Or at least -- or at the -- at the minimum, a -- like, a spear that he made. Because it was like this long pole with this, like, sharp -- super sharp object that was in one hand. And the other hand, it looked like he had -- like a sharp metal object in the other hand. And he was yelling some -- just gibberish. And, you know, he was within kind of the same distance as you and me. You know, it just -- it -- it can only take, like, a split-second for him to kill me or my partner. So my partner gave him quick commands. Like, "Hey, drop it." I told him in Spanish, "Bajalo." Or I was thinking -- I was thinking, like, to -- "Suelto." Like, "Just drop it." But he just kind of -- he was just -- we couldn't wait. Like, we just -- if -- if -- if we didn't shoot, we -- he would have killed us, or whatever, or tried to stab us, or -- you know, or, you know, caused us [REDACTED]. So we just had no other choice but to shoot. Yeah. We just -- and at that -- right at the same time that the P1 shot the 40, my partner and I also fired our -- our weapons. Because it was just -- it was either us -- it was either -- because it was -- it was -- was -- was, like, very close. Like, it was -- like, it wasn't like him and 15 yards away where we had time and stuff. And, you know, we had -- although we had the shield, it was just, still, he could have easily just, you know, gone on my -- stabbed my partner's legs and -- you know, he didn't have to walk towards my partner to stab him. He was just -- he had the -- that -- that crazy -- you know, it looked like the spear -- the dart or the dart gun. Or he could have just easily just lunged and stabbed my partner in the shins or the kneecap or -- or stab myself. My partner had the shield, but he didn't have his legs covered. And then I was exposed. So it was just to either shoot or -- or get stabbed, pretty much. We were in that position, and so we shot to -- to protect ourselves.<sup>29</sup>

It -- it pretty much looked like a -- like a harpoon gun. And so it looked like about -- about as -- the -- the diameter of like a fat -- a paper towel, but it was solid metal. And it was about -- it was black in color. And it was about 4 feet long. And then it had a -- like a narrow, sharp object -- like a -- like a harpoon, right, or -- or weird-looking spear that stuck out another -- an additional foot. And that was like chrome. And it was like metal and it was just like a weird -- yeah. Like, I -- you know, I -- at first glance, I thought it was a harpoon gun. Yeah. Or like a -- or a -- or like a homemade spear.<sup>30</sup>

Yeah. He kind of held it in a threatening manner. He was very tense. His eye -- his eyeballs were -- were popped out. He was yelling at us. He was, like, in a -- in a fighting stance, not -- it wasn't like "hey, get away from me; I'm gonna run away." It was more like "I'm gonna -- I'm gonna attack you; I'm gonna kill you." And the distance between me and him is the same distance as between you and me, you know, which is just like 5 feet away from -- I -- I just -- there was no -- there was no room for us to back up. And he had -- he had -- he had the advantage. He had -- he -- he had -- he had the ability -- if he -- if he really wanted to, he -- he could have backed up and retreated in. But we -- we were at -- we were at -- we were at a disadvantage where he just -- you know, he just had to take a -- just -- just lunge towards us

<sup>29</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Pages 17-19, Lines 22-15.

<sup>30</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 66, Lines 9-20.



*and stab us or -- or shoot the harpoon gun that -- it seem -- that appeared to be a harpoon gun at first glance.*<sup>31</sup>

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. And I see you -- when you're holding your hands there, you're holding them at about mid-chest height. Is that -- is that where he was holding them on him?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Yeah. It was like back and forth, like just -- he was just very agitated, just making -- just rap -- rapid body movements, just in a fighting stance, ready -- he was ready to charge, kind of like -- it seemed like he was taking the steps to come at -- like, just to charge towards us.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. Did he actually take any steps toward you?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: I remember he -- he -- he -- I -- if I remember correctly, I think his -- his lead foot did move towards us. Like, he was changing his -- his -- like, his -- I guess, his stance. And then -- and then -- and -- which I -- I -- I -- I thought -- I was -- I was in fear that he was gonna stab us or charge at us with the spear or shoot us with this harpoon gun.*<sup>32</sup>

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: He kept -- he kept moving it. He was just holding it in an aggressive manner, just -- kind of like just towards us, kind of down. You know, he was kind of -- looked like he was psyching himself to get ready to charge us, like he was ready to die or ready -- or ready to kill us or kill or be killed.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. And -- and you'd -- you'd given an indication of the -- the distance that he was from you, and then you -- you said earlier that he -- he took a step or a partial step forward. Did that decrease the distance between --*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Yes.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: -- the two of you?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Yes.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: By about how much?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: By a foot. Like, it -- yeah. Because it -- it appeared he -- he had cleared the threshold of his -- that door he kicked open. So he got like a foot closer to us, kind of just changing his stance, kind of just -- you know, just getting ready to -- to -- to impale us with this spear or harpoon gun and just kind of getting ready, psyching himself -- It looked like he was, like, gonna psych himself out -- or just getting, like, ready just to charge us and kill us. Or even if he had no weapons, just -- he could just -- he just -- shoved us off the balcony and killed -- and hurt -- hurt -- like, hurt us -- either one of us.*<sup>33</sup>

*DETECTIVE FULLER: -- at that point. Okay. So I'd like to kind of break down those shots. You -- you -- you mentioned you fired three shots. So that -- let's -- let's talk about the first shot. Okay. How -- how are you holding your pistol at this point?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: I was at a -- the low ready with a Weaver stance.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay.*

---

<sup>31</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Pages 67-68, Lines 25-18.

<sup>32</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Pages 69-70, Lines 18-11.

<sup>33</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Pages 72-73, Lines 23-24.



*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: And, you know, I'm just like, "Oh, shit. He's at" -- right? So I kind of raised my pistol. And I had my front sight on him. And, you know, he was -- it appeared that he was gonna charge us and try to kill us. And I just -- I had no other choice but to shoot and -- so I fired the first time.<sup>34</sup>*

## **Round Two**

According to Officer Bracamontes, Sanchez was still holding the weapons in a threatening manner. Believing Sanchez was still a threat to the officers' safety, Officer Bracamontes fired a second round from approximately ten feet away.

Officer Bracamontes recalled,

*He did -- there was no change in his body. He didn't drop. He didn't, like, back up or anything. So I fired a second shot.<sup>35</sup>*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: It didn't -- it didn't have an effect. It didn't have -- I mean, I -- I believe I shot him. I -- I -- I believe it did hit him, but I just didn't have the -- it doesn't have any -- enough -- it didn't -- it didn't stop him from what he was doing.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay.*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: It didn't stop the threat.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: And so now you -- you fired your second round.*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Yes.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. So why did you fire that second round?*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: He was still a threat. He could -- he was still trying to kill us. He was -- he -- he -- it didn't -- it didn't change his behavior at all, and it was just -- he still continued to hold the weapons in a threatening manner. He didn't -- like, "Oh, shit," like, and, like, fall back or anything. He just -- or become -- no longer become a threat. He was still a threat to us, to our -- to our safety.<sup>36</sup>*

## **Round Three**

According to Officer Bracamontes, Sanchez was still armed at the same "lunging, striking distance." Believing Sanchez was still a threat to the officers' safety, Officer Bracamontes fired his third and final round from approximately ten feet away, causing Sanchez to fall to the floor.

Officer Bracamontes recalled,

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. And then -- so you fired were you third round.*

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: Yes.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. And why?*

---

<sup>34</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 76, Lines 1-14.

<sup>35</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 76, Lines 14-16.

<sup>36</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Pages 78-79, Lines 8-2.

*OFFICER BRACAMONTES: He was still a danger to us. He was still armed. He was still in a tense fighting stance. He was still about to stab us. He was still, like, getting ready to -- to attack us or -- or shoot us with his harpoon gun. And so I had no other choice just to shoot him a third time.<sup>37</sup>*

*I had the front sight on him. But at this time on the third round, he just kind of dropped everything. He just kind of gasped. And he -- like, he started crying out in pain. And then he just fell on the floor. That's when he -- when he stopped -- when he was stopped -- when we -- he was no longer a threat is when we stopped shooting.<sup>38</sup>*

*2 seconds. It seemed short, but we were able to assess every time we fired. It was like just a pretty -- very -- it was very quick. You know? It was just very -- like, "boom." Then he's still up. "Boom." He's still up. He -- "boom." He's still a threat. And then -- then third shot, and he's like -- then he's like, "Oh." Then that's when I knew he -- he had -- it had the desired effect which, basically, stopped him from being a threat to our -- our lives.<sup>39</sup>*

**Officer Guerrero** – Smith & Wesson Model M&P9, 9-millimeter, three rounds from approximately ten feet, in a southerly direction.

**Background** – Upon inspecting the scene and relevant video evidence, FID investigators determined that the background for all three rounds was the same, consisting of a bedroom measuring 12 feet by ten feet and the south interior wall. A dresser drawer on the floor of the room was the only item identified as being struck by the officers' rounds.

### **Round One**

According to Officer Guerrero, Sanchez violently opened the interior door, “smashing” it against the wall and holding what appeared to be a sharp, stainless steel, approximately one-foot-long spear or projectile weapon that could shoot the sharp object or stab him. He ordered Sanchez to drop the weapon before Sanchez raised it and leaned forward approximately one foot. Believing Sanchez was moving forward to stab him and fearing Sanchez would kill him, Officer Guerrero fired his first round from his service pistol from approximately ten feet away, utilizing a one-handed grip with his right hand while holding the shield with his left arm. He was unsure if the round had struck Sanchez.

Officer Guerrero recalled,

*Um, so at this point I have the shield. I have my gun out. I see he's holding that -- it's a weapon. I don't know. It's -- it looks like a -- like a long ice pick that's manufactured into another tool. I don't know if it was a projectile that could shoot at that point because it was very long. Um, either way, um, he's staring. He's just like staring at us with like completely bug eyed, wide eyed. And he is just like completely focusing -- just focusing. Like, just*

<sup>37</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Pages 81-82, Lines 17-1.

<sup>38</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 83, Lines 9-15.

<sup>39</sup> Officer Bracamontes' transcript, Page 84, Lines 1-9.

*focusing on me, looking at me. And just -- if I ever -- if I ever thought anyone wanted to kill me, this was -- this was the guy. Like, he was just looking at me like he was going to -- that was it. Like, he had made his decision and he was going to try to kill me. Um, so the weapon that he's holding, it's -- it rises up. It rises up probably above his waist now. He's holding it. Body, um, just suddenly upper torso because that's what I'm focusing on. He's holding it in his upper torso area, just completely leans forward -- body weight forward. So I took that as he's advancing towards me. And, um, at that moment there -- there was nowhere to go. I was -- I really -- I -- I felt trapped. I -- there was nowhere to redeploy to. Um, if I -- if he came at me and I did nothing, I mean, I -- I would have been killed by the fall off of that -- that landing. Um, and I -- I shot to prevent that. I shot to prevent my own death and my partners who were there. And, um, at that point I shot until he was no longer a threat and when he was -- until he went down to the floor. At that point when he was no longer a threat and he dropped the weapon and went down on the floor and that's when I stopped shooting.<sup>40</sup>*

*I don't recall if he says anything or I think he's yelling -- I think he's yelling. I just remember his eyes were bulging out of his head. He's looking at me like he wants to kill me. He's holding that -- that weapon just above his waist. He comes up. He's looking at me and that's when the body moves forward in that kind of motion.<sup>41</sup>*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. So he -- he lunges forward or makes that move forward and you -- you said you fired some rounds at the -- at the suspect. How many rounds did you fire?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: I think when -- I think approximately two to three. Two to three, that's the -- that's what I think.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: I -- I don't recall for sure how many rounds.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: But --*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: But at least two?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Approximately, yeah, two, two to three.<sup>42</sup>*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: And so I -- I -- and I know you sort of gave a general reason why you fired all the rounds you fired, but why did you specifically fire that first round?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Like I said, he had -- when that door opened up when he slammed it open, he's holding the weapon. It's raised up. It's canted towards me. He's looking at me. And his body leans forward, so he's closing the distance and there's nowhere to go.<sup>43</sup>*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Sure. His posture is very rigid very, like, flexed rigid. He's holding it. It rises up as soon as the door kicks open and it cants a little forward like that. Then he -- he leans, and that's --*

<sup>40</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Pages 16-17, Lines 1-10.

<sup>41</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Pages 83-84, Lines 20-1.

<sup>42</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Page 89, Lines 5-19.

<sup>43</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Page 91, Lines 14-23.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Okay. So what -- and if I get any part of this wrong, please stop me and -- and correct me. But when you -- you're demonstrating what he's doing. You had both your left and right hand at hip level, your shoulder's raised and elbows bent. Then you, um, leaned your torso forward and then brought your right hand slightly forward away from your torso, um, and you turned your wrist so, um, an item being held by your fist at the top of your -- I'm sorry -- on the thumb side --

OFFICER GUERRERO: Right.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: -- started extending forward as your body leaned forward.

OFFICER GUERRERO: Yeah. All at the same time as I'm telling him to drop it, yes. It's --

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: That all occurred simultaneous --

OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: -- to you telling him to drop?

OFFICER GUERRERO: Yes.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Now, when you were demonstrating that the, um, his -- his fist that was going forward, it appeared to raise up to rib level from -- from waist level; is that correct?

OFFICER GUERRERO: It was above his waist. I'm not going to say it was, like, up here, right here, right here. It was above his waist so, yeah.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Okay. And when you said "you're not going to describe it up here" that was mid torso.

OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: And then almost to shoulder level. It's above his waist you indicated?

OFFICER GUERRERO: Yeah, it's above his waist definitely. It would --

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: How far -- yeah, and you indicated his torso is leaning forward?

OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: How far did his, um, right hand holding the weapon extend from his body if it did at all?

OFFICER GUERRERO: Rose it up, it's canted, then he leans forward. His body leaned forward. I would say the -- where it was at, maybe just about a foot. It closed the distance about a foot I would say.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: The gap between you and him?

OFFICER GUERRERO: Yes.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Closed it -- so a foot closer to you?

OFFICER GUERRERO: Yeah.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Okay.

OFFICER GUERRERO: About a foot because it was about -- yeah. Yeah, it closed about a foot.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Again, describe what that weapon was. What did -- what did you - when you saw it, what do you believe it was?

OFFICER GUERRERO: Immediately when I saw it I thought it was some kind of, like, make shift, like, a projectile that could, like, shoot or something some like -- like not a gun not -- not that kind, but it could, like -- like a little spear or something like that. Because it just looked very sharp. It looked like -- I -- I wouldn't even know what to -- what application that would have.

DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Okay.

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Um, but it definitely looked very make shift to me. I didn't know what I was looking at. And I was just -- it looked -- it was very sharp. It's a weapon. Very aggressive. And I -- I still don't know how to exactly describe that. I mean --*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Okay. Um, when we went back for the walk-through --*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: -- you pointed an item out as the item he was holding.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Yes.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Um, and -- and again it -- it was a pointed item approximately a foot in length at the time we observed it.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Is that how you observed it at the time, too, that length? Or was it -- I want to make sure it was in the same condition when you saw it in the walk-through is when you observed this?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Yes, nothing changed.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Nothing changed?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: No.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Okay. Can you describe the color?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Like stainless steel or just steel, something like that, yeah.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Okay. And -- and I'm asking and it doesn't have to be one or the other, are you assessing it to be -- what type of weapon? What kind of injury could that have caused you?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Fatal.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: And how so? Like, what type of, um, you talked about you didn't know if it could launch something.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: Is it a slashing instrument, like, a stabbing? I'm not suggesting it's either one of those.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: But can you -- what -- what did you think, what type of injury could it inflict?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: What kind of --*

*DETECTIVE RHEAULT: How would it be deadly?*

*CHRISTOPHER GUERRERO: If he stabbed me with it, if he -- if it is like a projectile like I originally assumed, like, he could shoot it from where he was at.<sup>44</sup>*

## **Round Two**

According to Officer Guerrero, Sanchez remained standing with the weapon still pointed at him. Officer Guerrero described Sanchez as looking “even angrier” and believed that he was going to continue advancing toward him and the other officers. In defense of himself and the other officers, Officer Guerrero fired his second round from his service pistol from approximately ten feet, still utilizing a one-handed grip with his right hand while holding the shield with his left arm.

---

<sup>44</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Page 117-121, Lines 1-15.



Officer Guerrero recalled,

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. And why did you fire that second round?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: The second round he appeared that he was going to continue to move forward again. He's still holding it. He's looking at me, looks even angrier and he has the -- the weapon, what I still don't know what it is, but it's that ice-pick looking thing, he has that. He's pointing it towards me and it looks like he's going to come forward again. And at that point I was -- I was really stuck. And it would have gone -- I had nowhere to go at all.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. And how did you feel, if you even had time to feel anything in this time period.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Um, I kind of thought the bullets weren't going to work, and I thought that -- I was kind of getting prepared to -- to get stabbed. I thought he was going to stab me.<sup>45</sup>*

### Round Three

According to Officer Guerrero, he was unsure whether he fired two or three rounds during the incident. The investigation determined that Officer Guerrero fired three rounds from his service pistol from approximately ten feet away, still utilizing a one-handed grip with his right hand while holding the shield with his left arm. Although Officer Guerrero was unsure if he fired his third round or not, he stated he stopped firing once Sanchez dropped the weapon, went down to the floor and stopped being a threat.

Officer Guerrero recalled,

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. So you -- you fired that second round.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Uh-huh.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Can you tell if it hits him?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: I can't tell if it hits him.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. Is there any change in what he's doing after the second round?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Um, I didn't see a change, no.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. Do you know with any degree of certainty whether or not you fired a third round?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: No, I don't.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay.*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: I don't know if I did for sure.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: But you're certain you fired two rounds?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: Yeah, I'm sure -- I'm certain I fired two rounds, yeah.*

*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. So you -- you mentioned much earlier on that you had stopped firing at a certain point. Why did you stop firing when you stopped firing?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: I stopped firing when the suspect was -- he started to go back and fall. And then I -- he was no longer a threat. So I -- I'm assuming my partner was more effective.*

---

<sup>45</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Page 92, Lines 5-21.



*DETECTIVE FULLER: Okay. So did -- so at -- so at -- when you fired your second round, did -- is that when he fell to the ground or was it sometime after you fired your second round?*

*OFFICER GUERRERO: It was -- it was after -- after that.<sup>46</sup>*

The UOFRB assessed Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero's use of lethal force and the findings were unanimous. The Board opined each application of lethal force for both officers was in direct response to Sanchez' actions and the imminent deadly threat posed by Sanchez as he advanced towards the officers while armed with a spear-like weapon that could have caused SBI or death. The Board further opined that Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero were unable to safely redeploy given the small space provided by the landing and the proximity of Sanchez. Additionally, Sanchez' actions could have caused the officers to fall off the [REDACTED] landing and noted only a short time had passed before Sanchez advanced towards the officers after they opened the exterior door. The Board also opined that both Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero assessed between rounds and stopped firing when Sanchez no longer posed a threat. Therefore, the UOFRB determined Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero's use of lethal force was proportional, objectively reasonable and necessary.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero, in the same situation, would reasonably believe that the use of lethal force was proportional, objectively reasonable and necessary.

Therefore, I find Officers Bracamontes and Guerrero's Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

### **Medical Treatment/Rendering Aid**

While Sanchez was on the [REDACTED] landing, Officer Guerrero requested an RA to standby at 1748:08 hours. The OIS occurred at 1750:38 hours and Officer Solorzano requested a backup and an RA at 1750:55 hours, 17 seconds after the OIS. At 1752 hours, one minute and 22 seconds after the OIS, Sanchez was completely handcuffed and rolled into a right lateral recumbent position. Officer Guerrero located a towel in the room and used it to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to Sanchez' wound at 1752:51 hours, two minutes and 13 seconds after the OIS.

Officer Moreno relieved Officer Guerrero and [REDACTED] on the wound. Officer Guerrero noted that Sanchez was breathing and had a pulse. At 1757:05 hours, six minutes and 27 seconds after the OIS, Officers Guerrero, Manzo and Moreno lifted Sanchez by his arms and legs and carried him downstairs, where they were met by LAFD personnel. The officers then assisted LAFD with carrying Sanchez to a gurney at the front of the residence. At 1801:28 hours, ten minutes and 50 seconds after the OIS, LAFD transported Sanchez to LA General. At 1955 hours, Sanchez was pronounced deceased by Doctor Demetriades.

---

<sup>46</sup> Officer Guerrero's transcript, Pages 92-94, Lines 22-4.

### **Requirement to Intercede**

Based on their review of this incident, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the force used was not clearly beyond that which was necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances, and that the officers did not deviate from the duty to intercede.

### **Additional/Equipment<sup>47</sup>**

**Required Equipment** – Officers Bracamontes and Stannard did not have a baton on their person. Officer Cisterna-Gallardo did not have a hobble restraint device (HRD) on her person. As these issues were addressed at the divisional level via Employee Comment Cards, with Operations-Central Bureau (OCB) and Office of Operations (OO) concurrence, I deem no further action necessary.

**Uniform Standards** - Sergeant Asawesna did not wear his BWV camera on his outermost garment, causing his jacket to cover his BWV camera at times during the incident. As this issue was addressed at the divisional level via Employee Comment Card, with OCB and OO concurrence, I deem no further action necessary.

### **Audio/Video Recordings**

Body Worn Video			
Sworn Employee	Issue	Inspection Date Range	
Officer Bracamontes	Late Activation	06/21/23 – 07/20/23	
Officer Manzo	Late Activation	09/23/23 – 10/22/23	

**Body Worn Video (BWV)** – Force Investigation Division investigators identified 83 BWVs related to the OIS. These BWVs were tagged in Evidence.com under Identification No. 23010300003108 and remain available for review.

**Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)** – It was determined the OIS was not captured on DICVS. Videos from the DICVS equipped units that responded to this incident have been archived in Coban and remain available for review.

---

<sup>47</sup> In determining the disposition for the deviation from Department policy, a review of the severity of the discrepancy in concert with any prior discrepancies was taken into consideration.

**Outside Video** – During the investigation, security video footage was downloaded from multiple locations near the scene. The footage was reviewed by FID investigators and vaulted at TID Electronics under their respective Media Control Numbers.

Video Source	Media Control No.	Footage
██████████	783968	Sanchez fleeing to ██████████ Officers responding. <sup>48</sup>
██████████	783969	Sanchez walking on Central Avenue and altercation with ██████ <sup>49</sup>
██████████	783970	Sanchez throwing objects on Central Avenue. <sup>50</sup>

**Photographs** – During this investigation, TID photographed the scene, involved officers and evidence under the below listed control numbers:

Control Nos.	Description
09048314 and 0906305	Involved officers and Sanchez
0906304 and 0906306	Scene
0905448, 0905478, and 0905479	Evidence collected by Forensic Services Division (FSD)
23010300003108 (Evidence.com)	██████ vehicle
313587 <sup>51</sup>	Officer Guerrero
313586 <sup>52</sup>	██████ vehicle

Respectfully,

████████████████████  
████████████████████  
████████████████████

MICHEL R. MOORE  
Chief of Police

<sup>48</sup> System time for this location was approximately one hour and five minutes ahead of actual time.

<sup>49</sup> System time for this location was approximately one hour and fifty-three minutes ahead of actual time.

<sup>50</sup> System time for this location was approximately thirty-two minutes ahead of actual time.

<sup>51</sup> Photographs were taken by an FID investigator with a Department phone.

<sup>52</sup> Photographs were taken by ██████ with ██████ phone.